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THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM:
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSITIONS
IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY1
Marie BOLTON
Universite Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand

Nancy C. UNGER
Santa Clara University, California

L'efficacite de la democratie directe dans l'histoire de la Californie reste un sujet de debat
intense, un phenomene aI'echelle de l'Etat de Califomie mais qui suscite l'attention du
monde entier. L'article offre une analyse de cette experience depuis ses debuts en 1911
et apporte un contrepoint a la vague de critiques formulees contre le principe des
referendums d'initiative populaire. II etudie la protection de l'environnement, un sujet
qui oppose clairement Les interets de la population et ceux des plus puissantes
entreprises californiennes. La conclusion est que malgre /es abus, les distorsions et Les
problemes, la democratie directe, meme imparfaite, reste un outil efficace pour proteger
I'environnement. Devant l'inertie de I'assemblee legislative et des gouverneurs successifs, et face aux pressions enormes exercees par Les entreprises pour prevenir toute
legislation sur la protection de l'environnement, l'exemple de la democratie directe en
Californie, telle qu'on peut en juger par Les resultats electoraux des referendums de la
fin du XX' siecle, justifie un optimisme prudent.

Direct democracy in California represents an imperfect addition to a flawed political process ... [and]
should be regarded more as a warning than an
exampie.2
[C]itizens... often stand to benefit from the laws
created through the initiative and referendum. 3

l. The authors would like to thank Santa Clara University for its generous support, and students Blair Thedinger and Patty Adams for their research assistance.
2. Wyn Grant, "Direct Democracy in California: Example or Warning?" Democratization, 3.1 (1996), pp. 147-148.
3. Richard Braunstein, "Practicing Democracy: Initiative and Referendum Voting
at the End of the 20th Century," Ph.D. diss. (University of Colorado, 1999), p. 201.
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Environmentalists clearly have won-it's an effective
tool for them. 4
[V]oting on the propositions is a strikingly idiosyncratic process. s

Establishing California's "Fourth Branch"
of Government
The efficacy of direct democracy throughout California's history
continues to be a subject of intense debate, a state-wide phenomenon
with an international audience. California boasts the world's fifth largest
economy, and plays a leadership role in national, and sometimes even
international, politics. British scholar Wyn Grant, studying the politics of
air quality management in California, succinctly sums up the burning
issue for environmentalists worldwide who are striving to understand
the efficacy of California's activists' efforts: in "Direct Democracy in
California: Example or Warning?" Grant concludes that although direct
democracy has its merits, its history in California ultimately provides
more of a cautionary tale than a model to be emulated. Other scholars,
examining the same phenomenon, disagree, but for a variety of contradictory reasons.6
Previously we examined how other democratic traditions and
practices, in particular community activism within California, have been
utilized to promote environmental justice. This study weighs in on the
debate over the efficacy of direct democracy to bring about environ4. Patrick McGuigan quoted in Thomas Cronin, Direct Democraci1: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 200.
5. John Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends
of California," American Political Science Review, 63.4 (1969), p. 1211.
6. See Silvano Mockli, "Direckte Demoktratie in Kalifornien," Annuaire Suisse de
Science Politique, 31 (1991), pp. 27-44, and Larry Berg & C.B. Holman, "The Initiative
Process and its Declining Agenda-Setting Value," Law and Policy [Britain], 11.4 (1989),
pp. 451-469. Grant, pp. 133-149. Elisabeth Gerber, for example, argues that features
of the legislature, especially party organization, lead legislators elected to represent
their constituents to vote against their district majority preference. Direct legislation,
therefore, is frequently the truer measure of the will of the people. Elisabeth Gerber,
"Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representation: The Effects of State Legislative
Institutions on Policy," Political Research Quarterly, 49.2 (1996), pp. 263-286. Cynthia
DeChaine, on the other hand, contests the wisdom of following the "will of the
people." She reveals how NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard) and a number of other
factors including education and communication, led to the defeat of a 1997 referendum that would have created an environmentally and economically sound landfill
project. Cynthia DeChaine, "The NIMBYism in Modern Suburbia: The Case of
Pomona," International Science Review, 73.1-2 (1998), pp. 103-117.
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mental protection. 01,11' initial assumptions, based on a great deal of secondary material and much anecdotal evidence, including our own experiences as California voters, led us to our working title, "Using Direct
Democracy to Thwart the Will of the People: California Envirorunental
Propositions in the Late Twentieth Century." However, as we more
closely evaluated the sources, especially the actual campaigns of the late
twentieth century and their outcomes, we came to a startling conclusion.
It is not, despite many scholars' assertions to the contrary, a case of
"simple black or white, but rather a dirty shade of grey." Further
investigation revealed results in even lighter tones. Despite its many
abuses, distortions, and problems, direct democracy remains an avenue
to be utilized, however imperfectly, to protect the environment.7
Our focus is state, rather than nation-wide, not just because of
California's political and economic prominence. What makes California
unique even among the states utilizing direct democracy methods is how
frequently and consistently it has exercised these mechanisms. Although
intended by some of its creators to be a lifeboat to be used only in
extreme circumstances, direct democracy has been termed the "fourth
branch" of the state's political system. By the late 1970s, California was
using the initiative more widely than any other democratic society.8
Any effort to answer Grant's question as to California's appropriateness as role model for direct democracy, especially concerning
environmental issues, requires an understanding of both the promise
and the reality of nearly a century of Californians' efforts to control
their state. Neither the initiative, the referendum, nor the recall, were
pioneered in California. Switzerland incorporated referendums into its
1874 constitution, guaranteeing the rights of citizens to approve or
reject decisions made by the government, as well as the right to initiate
legislation. Within the United States, South Dakota made the initiative
and the referendum a part of its state constitution in 1898. Eight other

7. Marie Bolton & Nancy C. Unger, "Pollution, Refineries, and People: Environmental Justice in Contra Costa County, California, 1980," Le demon moderne: Ia pollu-

tion dans les societes urbaines et industrielles d'Europe/The Modern Demon: Pollution in
Urban and Industrial Societies (Clermont-Ferrand: Blaise Pascal University Press,
2002), pp. 425-438. Marie Bolton mariebolton@minitel.net "Re:Taming the Tiger!," 13
Jan. 2003, personal email. Direct democracy measures do not take place in a vacuum,
however. California's adoption of term limits, for example, ensures a steady stream
of inexperienced, short term legislatures. The subject of the impact of term limits on
California government, including direct democracy measures, is a story that is still
unfolding and one that warrants careful future study.
8. Eugene C.' Lee, "The Initiative and Referendum: How California Has Fared,"
National Civic Review, 68.2 (1979), p. 69.
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western or mid-western states followed suit before Californians voted
overwhelmingly to join them in 1911.9
California's passion for direct democracy was born out of Progressivism, an amorphous movement that is maddeningly difficult to define,
and yet one undeniable in its significance. Although various progressives sought diverse, sometimes mutually exclusive goals, all shared a
desire to right the wrongs of Gilded Age America. The "gilt" of the
period of amazing growth at the turn of the twentieth century was glittering indeed, as industrialization and urbanization quickly transformed
the United States, enhancing its position economically and politically. But
rising right along with the gross national product were concerns about
the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth and power. America's
reputation as a land of glorious opportunity seemed to be realized
exclusively by major industrialists who pulled the ladder up after themselves rather than allow others to ascend. Citizens who sought remedies
from their political representatives frequently found government at best
helpless to curb the harmful excesses, or, at worst, a willing collaborator, as the influence of elected officials was purchased covertly or even
overtly. Specific solutions to redistribute more equitably the nation's
wealth ranged from natural resource preservation to tax and labor
legislation, while efforts to redistribute the political power centered on
election reforms, including the direct election of U.S. Senators (previously nominated by state legislators), the initiative, the referendum, and
the recall, all designed to return political power to the people. 10
In Los Angeles, direct democracy was spearheaded by John
Randolph Haynes, a Fabian and successful physician who facilitated, at
the city level, the nation's first initiative, referendum, and recall legislation in 1902, leading to the first recall of a public official in 1904. In the
minds of citizens throughout the state, the biggest corrupter of the
legislature was the Southern Pacific Railroad, famously depicted in a
political cartoon as an octopus, with each of its eight legs wound around
some crucial aspect of California's political and economic system.
Progressivism, as the potential slayer of this beast, was personified by
Hiram Johnson, elected to the governor's chair in 1910. The combined
efforts of Haynes and Johnson soon made California a leader in direct
democracy. But with what results? 11

9. John M. Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 1898-1998 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 3.
10. See Nancy C. Unger, Fighting Bob IA Follette: The Righteous Reformer (Chapel
Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
11. See Tom Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive (Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1992). Frank Norris's classic novel The Octopus (1901)
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Critics paint a very dark picture indeed. From the very beginning,
ballot measures have been fraught with confusion. In 1912, a "yes" vote
on a referendum meant a vote in favor of the statute as passed by the
legislature, while a "no" vote meant a vote to revoke that statute, so a
vote "yes" meant a vote against the aim of the referendum. " It was
enough," notes scholar John Allswang, "to confuse anybody." As voter
pamphlets more clearly explained what each vote meant, and the
number of measures on the ballot escalated, responsible voting required
increasing amounts of careful study prior to stepping into the voting
booth. Lengthy newspaper articles provided extensive information on
all sides of the issues, augmented in more recent years by websites
produced not only by the official proponents and opponents of various
measures, but also by concerned citizens. While many celebrate these
extensive offerings as some of the most valuable fruits of the "Information Age," this potential overload has led to what some scholars have
termed "voter fatigue," which has resulted in complex measures being
reduced to campaigns of catchy slogans, and, in more recent years,
radio "sound bites" and fifteen-second television commercials. 12
The role played by money in direct democracy from its first
implantation in California caused many to question the ability of the
measures to truly carry out the will of the people. As early as 1917
critics noted the enormously expensive campaigns launched by big
business concerns to counter various proposals and were especially
vocal in their opposition to the professional signature gatherers necessary to place measures on the ballot. Valid signatures from a number of
registered voters equal to 8 percent of the vote in the preceding gubernatorial election were required to put a measure on the ballot, a process
that critics argued benefited only those campaigns sufficiently well
funded to hire signature gatherers. The regulations also limited successful signature gathering to urban areas with sufficient populations to
make signature solicitation profitable. The expense and organization
involved in putting measures on the ballot, critics claimed, made direct
democracy a big business in its own right. 13
Although scholars hold a variety of contradictory opinions about
the role of money in a ballot measure's success, many are based on
details the death struggle between w heat farmers and a railroad monopoly in
California's San Joaquin Valley.
12. Allswang, p. 19. See also Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 74. See
Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Trudi Happ, "Ballot Propositions and Information Costs: Direct Democracy and the Fatigued Voter," Western Political Quarterly,
45.2 (1992), pp. 559-568.
13. Allswang, p. 144.
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popular perception rather than evidence. In fact, from the very beginning, major funding has never been a guarantee that a proposition would
succeed, although significantly, "it could almost always guarantee that
one could be beaten." Moreover, the widespread belief that increased
spending over the years has increasingly determined election results has
been disproved by a careful study of sixty years of campaign spending
and election results showing that spending on direct democracy measures, adjusted for inflation, has been remarkably consistent. A variety
of factors, however, do impinge on the ability of direct democracy to
carry out the will of the people. In an early example, even proponents of
the process were frustrated by the ability of political conservatives to
undo some of Hiram Johnson's progressive programs by utilizing the
very measures of direct democracy they had initially opposed.14
Direct democracy measures continued to be confusing and related
expenditures difficult to trace, as the ostensibly altruistic organization
formally funding one side of a measure frequently turned out to be a
front for a corporation with great profits at stake. Moreover, voters
suffered from "ballot fatigue," brought on by the increasing number of
measures requiring their vote. Frequently, but not always, position on
the ballot directly affected the number of votes cast, as propositions
higher on the ballot, regardless of subject matter, received more votes.
By 1938, the San Francisco Chronicle claimed that initiatives and referendums "have become a means of confusion and tinkering, crackpot schemes
and frequent frustration of public information." They remained an integral part of California's political fabric, however, and frequently revealed
much about the goals and values of th e state's residents. In 1964, for
example, California voters passed a measure to overturn the Fair Housing
Act passed by the state legislature the preceding year, an outcome that
seemed more in keeping with the openly racist southern United States
than "liberal" California. The California Supreme Court ultimately ruled
unconstitutional this decision by two thirds of the state's voters to deny
African Americans fair housing, just one example of the fate of a controversial initiative ultimately being decided by the courts. 15
Environmentalists' interest in this system of government was born
out of California's number of unique features including an enormous
and ever increasing population (growing in the twenty-first century at a
rate of around 600,000 people a year), and a shockingly arid climate. For
example, the San Jose area, by the 1990s a suburban sprawl of lush palm
trees and green suburb lawns, home to the world-renown Silicon
14. Allswang, p. 49. John R. Owens & Larry L. Wade, "Campaign Spending on
California Ballot Propositions, 1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects," Western Political
Quarterly, 39.4 (1986), pp. 675-689.
15. Bowler, Donovan, & Happ. Allswang, pp. 65, 61.
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Valley, averages 14 inches/35 centimeters of rainfall per year, less than
Casablanca. The state, whose survival depends on vast, ongoing manipulation of natural resources, including the world's largest and most
expensive water delivery system, is especially vulnerable to environmental devastation. Environmental problems range from the high levels
of mercury left over from the 1849 Gold Rush that still contaminate San
Francisco bay waters and marine life, to the two million tons of hazardous waste Californians currently generate every year. The vast profits
of California corporations, ranging from agribusiness to high tech
weapons development, have allowed them to yield enormous economic
and political power. In the showdowns between profits and clean air or
water, profits have continually won out. Many in California found their
elected officials, unable to resist the siren song of large campaign
contributions, rendered seemingly oblivious to the environmental crises
ravaging the state. With all hopes dashed that relief would come from
the legislature, environmental protection advocates repeatedly turned
to direct, rather than representative democracy as the only means by
which polluters and exploiters could be controlled. 16
Direct democracy quickly became the new battleground for the
water wars that so dominate California's environmental history. The
attempt in 1914 to invalidate the newly created state commission to
adjudicat~ water rights failed, but only by the narrowest of margins. In
the 1920s three well funded initiatives proposing a state water and
power commission that would have the right to issue bonds and to use
the proceeds to expand public control of water and power all fell victim
to powerful campaigns funded by business organizations and private
power companies determined to resist government regulation of these
vital resources. However, the record of direct democracy in protecting
the environment was fairly strong throughout the 1930s as many Californians understood the reckless avarice of big business to be the root
cause of the Great Depression. Voters have fairly consistently opposed
propositions during adverse economic conditions. In 1933, the Central
Valley Water Project, passed by the state legislature, resisted a repeal
referendum launched by private power companies. During this period
voters also rejected four different attempts to allow state-owned beach
lands to be leased for mineral and oil production. 17
16. Allswang, pp. 64, 136. Paul Rogers, "Green Blitz for State Parks: Environmentalists Push Prop. 12," San Jose Mercun; News 2 March 2000: lA, 16A. "Toxic Questions," Department of Toxic Waste, 2000 <www.dtsc.ca.gov/ToxicQuestions/DTSC_
Overview.html> 10 Jan. 2003.
17. Based on a study of 1974-92. Sean Bowler & Todd Donovan, "Economic Conditions and Voting on Ballot Propositions," American Politics Quarterly, 22.1 (1994),
pp. 27-40. Allswang, p. 43.

88

MARIE BOLTON - NANCY C. UNGER

In 1956, the year of the Suez crisis, came one in what would become
a long series of propositions funded by "Big Oil" which, in the name of
eliminating waste and maximizing production, threatened state-owned
tidelands and the public interest. Although vastly outspent, the foes of
the oil forces mounted an effective counter-campaign, demonstrating
the maxim that money alone cannot guarantee success. Eight environmentally-related measures were introduced between 1970 and 1982,
illuminating both the frustration of many with the legislature's inability
to keep up with environmental abuses, and the conflicts between environmental protection and economic development. The record for 1972
provides a good example of the inconsistent, yet overall protectionist
results of such measures: Proposition 9, which proposed a wide variety
of reforms from pesticide restrictions to a five-year ban on the construction of nuclear powered electric generating plants, went down to
defeat. Five months later, Proposition 20, a measure to protect coastal
lands, passed, despite the fact that the plan had originally died in
committee when presented to the state legislature and despite the
disproportionate swns spent by Shell Oil and other business and labor
organizations to ensure its defeat. In 1982, Californians determined to
protect the environment overturned legislation that would expand the
Central Valley Water Project and voted to require the governor to petition the President of the United States to, along with the Soviet Union,
stop nuclear testing, production, and deployment. 18
In the more recent debates over the effectiveness of direct democracy, several factors are emphasized by those claiming that it is becoming increasingly undemocratic. They point, for example, to the frequently tiny number (less than 25 percent) of voters who determine a
measure's success or failure. In addition, as California's population
grows, so does the number of signatures required to place a measure
on the ballot, revitalizing charges that money remained the key to all
forms of California politics. Environmentalists have been outraged by
the efforts of various polluters to utilize the initiative process to protect
themselves. In 1994, for example, the Philip Morris Company, a major
tobacco producer, contributed $13 million to an initiative promoted as
"anti-smoking," that, if passed, would have reduced rather than intensified existing regulations concerning smoking in public places. 19
Environmentalists who defend direct democracy note that ballot
measures can be funded not just by big businesses, but also by popular
organizations such as labor unions and, frequently, by grass roots
18. Allswang, p. 140.
19. David Hadwiger, "Money, Turnout, and Ballot Measure Success in California
Cities," Western Political Quarterly, 45.2 (1992), pp. 539-547. See Berg & Holman.
Allswang, p. 199.
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groups that are environmentally motivated. The often tiny budgets of
these groups do not guarantee the defeat of the measures they propose
-in many instances, environmental Davids have slain corporate
Goliaths. And while direct democracy defenders acknowledge that the
actual number of votes on any particular measure may be small, they
claim that because Americans are decreasingly voting a straight party
ticket and increasingly voting on the merits of the specific individuals
and/ or issues in involved, the votes that are cast are based on more
thoughtful and informed decision-making than blind party alliance.
Direct democracy defenders also note that, despite the system's various
imperfections, it still is more truly representative of the people than are
the legislators they elect. Although elected officials may, in recent times,
be as likely to be influenced by pressures from within their party
organizations as by the bribes of big business or the influence of professional lobbyists, the end result remains the same: they vote against the
majority preference of their districts.20
Direct democracy has yielded decidedly mixed results from its
inception in 1911. In Part Two: "Environmental Propositions in Late
Twentieth Century California," we examine more recent, specific developments in the history of direct democracy measures, and offer some
conclusions as to the appropriateness of California's "fourth branch of
government" as a model for other states and nations seeking to remedy
environmental wrongs.

Environmental Propositions
in Late Twentieth Century California
The first thing to impress an observer of California initiative campaigns
in the 1980s and 1990s is the explosion of big money involved. The
California Commission on Campal.gn Financing reports that from 19761990, spending on initiatives jumped by 1200%, from $8.9 million to over
$110 million. In 1988 and 1990, for the first time, more money was spent
on initiative campaigns that on lobbying the state legislature. In 1990,
67% of all initiative campaign funds were raised in amounts of $100,000
or more, and over 33% in amounts of over $1 million. Business
20. Carl Lutrin & Allen K. Settle, "The Public and Ecology: The Role of Initiatives
in California's Environmental Politics," Western Political Quarterly, 28 (1975), pp. 352371. Lee, p. 76. See also Micah L. Sifrey, "Independents' Day," The Nation, 18 June
2001, pp. 4-5, and Sifrey's Spoiling for a Fight: Third-ParhJ Politics in America, Routledge
2002. Gerber, pp. 263-286. See also Richard Braunstein, "Practicing Democracy:
Initiative and Referendum Voting at the End of the 2011' Century," Ph.D. diss. (University of Colorado, 1999).
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contributed over 66% of initiative campaign funds, individuals 12%,
politicians 9%, political parties 7%, and labor 1%. In the 1990s, every
election was dominated by a major economic battle in which corporations spent without limit in order to advance their economic interests.
This increase in spending brought about a professionalization of initiative campaigns and operations which in turn generated more expenses.
The cost of qualifying an initiative for ballot increased from $45,000 in
1976 to over $1 million 1990, due in large part to the increasing need for
paid signature gatherers to keep pace with the rapid growth of the
population, as pointed out above, a practice long denounced as a major
problem. In addition, professional political consultants managed every
part of a initiative campaign, starting with the use of paid signature
firms which could guarantee almost any client automatic qualification for
about $1 million.2 1
California corporations were investing in initiative campaigns as a
means of selling to voters their political and economic vision of California. Many observers, of all political stripes, have decided that this is
reason enough to consider direct democracy in California a failure. David
Broder went so far as to title his 2000 book, Democracy Derailed: Initiative
Campaigns and the Power of Money. 22 This article seeks to counter the tide
of criticism of the initiative process. Rather than addressing all initiatives
and propositions in the same manner, here we focus solely on environmental politics, issues which we argue most clearly pit popular interests
against California's largest and most powerful corporations. We argue
that corporate manipulation and political corruption is so pervasive in
the California political system that direct democracy, despite clear abuse,
remains the best chance of voters to counter the power of big business.
If we indulge in a bit of "if history," as did historian Joseph Zimmerman,
we agree that the progressives who put into place direct democracy
would be disturbed by the large sums spent by corporate interests to
undermine the initiative process, but "their trust in the common sense of
the average citizen would be undaunted." To demonstrate our argument, this portion of our article first outlines the two principle methods
used to corrupt the California initiative process in the late twentieth
century: the co-optation of initiatives and the rise of counter-initiatives.
It then considers the experiences of certain environmental propositions
in 1988 and 1990, and finally presents our analysis and conclusions.23
21. California Commission on Campaign Financing; Jim Shultz, The Initiative Cookbook (San Francisco: The Democracy Center, 1998), p. 81.
22. David Broder, Democraci; Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Monei;
(New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2000).
23. Joseph Zimmerman, Participaton; Democraci;: Populism Revived (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1986), pp. 96-97.
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Starting in the 1970s, state politicians of both parties attached their
names to initiative campaigns as a way of attracting voters. In his 1974
gubernatorial prima1y campaign, democrat Jerry Brown joined with
Common Cause and other reform groups to support a proposition that
would limit lobbyist spending to "two hamburgers and a Coke." The
June proposition won by a two to one margin, and Brown rode the reformist wave into the governor's office in November. Similarly, republicans supported ballot measures that seemed tough on crime. George Deukmejian's
close association with initiatives to reinstate the death penalty and his
campaign position in favor of capital punishment helped him win election
as Attorney General in 1978 and Governor in 1982. As one analyst put
it, the "adopt an initiative strategy" can result in a "dangerous political
whirpool in which extreme initiatives get adopted by mainstream leaders
trying to capitalize on popular emotion. The public votes to send a
message, but it is the detail of the law that Californians must live with,
long, long after the politician involved has moved on to other
ambitions."24
The co-optation of initiatives continued to increase. Between 1988
and 1996, candidates for statewide office and other politicians either
sponsored or affiliated themselves closely with twenty-one ballot initiatives. State democrats in the 1980s associated themselves particularly
with environmentalist initiatives as a way to boost their personal campaigns. Environmental groups, in turn, solicited the support of state
democrats, eschewing non-partisan politics in exchange for the support
offered by the democratic political machine. When the Sierra Club asked
democrat leaders in 1986 for financial support for Proposition 65, the
"anti-toxics" initiative, Democratic Assemblyman Tom Hayden adopted
the measure as his central cause, bringing with him popular and lucrative
Hollywood connections. Democrat candidates for Governor Tom
Bradley and Senate Alan Cranston also strongly backed Prop 65,
seeking an issue which would distinguish them from their republican
counterparts. In part due to this powerful support, Prop 65 passed in
the November election by a two to one margin. Although Bradley lost
his race, most analysts credit Cranston's slim re-election to his association with the initiative.
In 1990, environmental initiatives became even further entangled
with state partisan politics. Environmental groups were preparing to
launch a variety of separate measures to control pesticide use, and to
protect coasts and forests. Some groups, wary of becoming embroiled in
partisan issues, planned to draft measures sufficiently bipartisan to win
support from both democrat and republican candidates. At the same
24. Shultz, pp. 86, 88.
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time, Tom Hayden and democrat gubernatorial candidate John Van de
Kamp proposed to combine all the initiatives into one single proposition
and make it radical enough so that republican candidate for governor
Pete Wilson would be forced to campaign against it. Although many
environmentalists opposed this strategy, Hayden and Van de Kamp
were able to win enough support to place Proposition 128, "Big Green,"
on the November ballot. The measure was drafted by Van de Kamp,
along with Hayden, the Sierra Club, the California League of
Conservation Voters, and the National Resources Defense Council. Van
de Kamp also supported two other non-environmental initiatives,
certain that his sponsorship would strengthen his own campaign position with voters. When he lost the June primary to Dianne Feinstein, all
these initiatives were left half-orphaned, losing Van de Kamp's political
and financial support as well as the services of his professional campaign
staff. Although Prop 128 was hopelessly entangled in the gubernatorial
campaign, both Dianne Feinstein and her republican opponent Pete
Wilson kept their distance from it, with Feinstein embracing it gingerly
and Wilson opposing it gingerly. Prop 128 lost in the November election,
victim to political manipulation, its own complexity, a crowded ballot,
attacks on Hayden, and as we shall see, a blizzard of corporate counterinitiatives. Its loss is generally seen as a major reverse of Prop 65's
victory four years earlier.25
The loss of this strongly partisan and politically oriented environmental proposition can also be understood as a sign of voters' ability to
distinguish between citizen group initiatives and political machine
initiatives. Direct democracy was developed to help voters counter the
ability of powerful corporations to corrupt political parties, individual
office holders, and the state political system. The initiative was viewed
as a way to help voters force reform on specific issues and was purposefully created to bypass the political negotiations in the legislature
which often bogged down progress. In the late 20th century, most successful environmental propositions were written by environmental citizen
reformers, targeted specific issues, were short, and avoided bureaucratic
detail and political issues. In contrast, Prop 128 was the creation of
political maneuvering, was particularly long (16,000 words in contrast to
most initiatives which averaged around 5,000), and in one of its most
controversial sections, created a new state agency. The Office of Environmental Advocate would have been a statewide elected position with
a four-year term and broad powers to use the courts to enforce all laws
"enacted to protect the environment and public health." 26 Opponents
25. Ibid., 86-7; Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990.
26. The full texts of ballot proposals are available at <http:/ / holmes.uchastings.
edu>; Los Angeles Daily Journal, 1 November 1990.
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very quickly labeled this position the "envirorunental czar" or "environmental cop," and warned voters against the potential for a new layer of
bureaucracy in the state government created to undertake investigations, studies, and analyses, and to bring lawsuits "to ensure compliance
with state laws." Voters responded to this argument and were sensitive
to the proposition's political entanglements. The dissonance was too
strong between the limited thrust of direct democracy initiatives and the
octopus-like form of Prop 128.
Prop 128 shared the 1990 ballot with a wave of counter-initiatives.
When in 1986, Prop 65, the anti-toxics initiative, passed in spite of an
extensive and expensive "no" campaign waged by oil companies and manufacturers, industry understood that with issues which aroused public
emotion, a simple call to vote "no" was not enough. In 1988, insurance
companies began a trend to place counter-initiatives on the ballot, resulting in a ballot on which five separate initiatives dealing with automobile
insurance and tort reform appeared. The 1990 ballot featured a blizzard
of health and environment initiatives and counter-initiatives. Each
counter-measure was designed to nullify its progressive counterpart.
Rather than presenting genuine alternatives, they aimed at confusing
voters and dragging down all competing initiatives to maintain the
status quo, itself imposed in part by industry's traditional political
lobbying tactics. Industry created front organizations with citizenfriendly names to author ballot initiatives, further confusing voters.
These strategies were to some degree successful. In what was called
"the Big NO," voters in 1990 rejected all competing measures, including
those with strong polling leads shortly before the election. Out of the
total twenty-seven sometimes complicated initiatives on the ballot,
voters only passed twenty-three.27 Most analyses of this election focus
on four competing envirorunental initiatives, as well as two competing
health/alcohol tax initiatives, to demonstrate the success of corporate
tactics, but as we shall see the situation was far more complex.
We have already illustrated the political manipulation of the
initiative process with the example of Prop 128 on the 1990 ballot. Prop
128, which would have required significant environmental reform, is
also a good example of the counter-initiative process. Prop 128, presented by its supporters as "Big Green," would have imposed a fiveyear phase-out of many pesticides, banned the sale within the state of
any food containing residues of proven cancer-causing pesticides,
curbed off-shore drilling in state waters, established a $500 million oilspill clean-up fund, required upgraded sewage-treatment plants,
required a 40% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2010, and
27. See Los Angeles Daily Journal, 7 November 1990.
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spent $300 million to protect ancient redwood stands and plant new
trees.28 California's most powerful corporations, those dominating its
extensive petro-chemical industry, poured millions of dollars into the
effort to defeat Prop 128, both directly and through the sponsorship of
their own initiative, Prop 135.
The petro-chemical industry was especially alarmed about Prop
128's requirements for emission reductions and its limits on pesticide
use. Their failure in 1986 to stave off approval of Prop 65, the anti-toxics
initiative, with dire economic projections designed to convince voters to
vote "no," prompted them early on to consider multiple strategies to
defeat Prop 128. A year before the June 1990 election, the Western Agricultural Chemical Association was pressing its members for money and
organizing its own anti-initiative group, Californians for Food Safety. It
hired Woodward and McDowell, a campaign-management firm long
active in California initiative battles, who began a series of radio advertisements against the initiative. In August 1989, Woodward and
McDowell were forced to recall their ads until they added a required
disclaimer that chemical company money had heavily financed them. To
ensure defeat of Prop 128, the industry also launched its own initiative,
Prop 135, quickly dubbed "Big Brown" by opponents. Prop 135 proposed to voters far less stringent regulations than Prop 128 and specifically nullified its pesticide portions. In the case of passage of two or
more competing initiatives, the one with the most votes is dominant. At the
least, Prop 135 could be counted on to confuse voters, and if Prop 128
were to succeed, industry could gamble that Prop 135 would as well,
and perhaps override it with its own, industry-friendly measures.29
With such high stakes and with such powerful players, the amount
of money spent on the 1990 initiative campaigns was astronomical. Out
of the $6.5 million raised to defeat Prop 128, over $5 million came from
oil and chemical companies.30
As Carl Pope, national conservation director for the Sierra Club
explained, "What is driving this is pesticides, pesticides, pesticides."
California had long been the nation's largest agricultural producer and
consumer of pesticides. In 1987 alone, 600 million pounds of pesticides
were sold in California. Campaign-finance statements show that chemical
companies with extensive pesticide divisions donated over $3.2 million to
the campaign to defeat Prop 128 and oil companies added almost $1.8
million. According to Rick Rountree, spokesman for Rhone-Poulenc
Agriculture Company, "While it's a lot of money, it is not large in terms
28. See <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu>
29. Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990; Shultz, p. 89; <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.
edu>.
30. San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990; Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990.
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of the amount of business we do in California because of the size and
importance of agriculture in the state." Skip Ragland, spokesman for
Ciba-Geigy, said the company could lose 30% of its California business if
Prop 128 were approved and that opposition to Prop 128 is "certainly
worth the amount of money that's been reported from various
companies." Prop 128 would have made it illegal to sell any food grown
outside the state with a pesticide banned within it. Industry was
concerned that California would provide an example for other states
that might adopt similar restrictions, or that growers might reduce or
eliminate pesticide use outside of the state to make sure they could sell
crops in the huge California market. Bob Neunreiter, of Monsanto,
pointed out: "It's not just the alachlor [herbicide] market in California,
it's our alachlor market in Iowa and Indiana, and the major impact on
that business if 128 should pass."31
Largest Contributors to Campaign to Defeat Prop 128,
Operations Concerned, and
Pesticides Likely to be Banned by the Measure:32
Company
Monsanto
ARCO
Chevron
ICI Americas
Ciba-Geigy
DuPont
DowElanco
Rhone-Poulenc

Contribution
Operation and Pesticides Concerned
Pesticides: alachlor
405,000
Oil
397,000
Oil
395,000
Pesticides: captan
379,500
Pesticides: simazine, methidiathon
375,500
Pesticides: mancozeb, benomyl, atrazine, linuron
365,000
Pesticides
359,000
Pesticides: fosetyl al, aidicarb
249,000

Other industry representatives minimized the impact of the measure
on their businesses and portrayed their opposition as altruistic. George
Dunn, government affairs manager for ARCO, said that Prop 128
"doesn't affect us that much economically," but that the company was
worried that the measure "would have such a drastic effect on the
economy that people would rebel." The front group created by the
agrochemical industry, Californians for Food Safety, was joined by the
petrochemical industry's Californians for Air and Water Quality. When
polls demonstrated that because of Tom Hayden's radical youth, voters
were wary of his close association with the initiative, a third front group
was created, "No on 128, The Hayden Initiative." Voters were then
misleadingly presented with opposition to Prop 128 under the cover of
progressive or anti-radical sounding organizations, rather than as a "vote
31. San Francisco Chronicle, 4 October 1990, 31 October 1990; San Jose Mercury
News, 11 October 1990.
32. San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990.
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no" movement coming from industry opponents. In contrast to the vast
swns spent by California's economic powerhouses to defeat Prop 128,
supporters of the measure raised only $3 million. They were successful
in making contribution patterns a major campaign issue, but instead of
creating support for Prop 128, this only increased cynicism about the
initiative process and encouraged the "Big NO" vote. Prop 128 failed with
64% "no" votes cast, and Prop 135 failed with 70% "no" votes cast.33
Following the election, environmentalists readily admitted their
errors. Sierra Club conservation director Carl Pope concluded that in the
future, environmentalists would push for narrow propositions, rather
than broad ones that were now proven too easy to defeat. Lucy Blake,
of the California League of Conservation Voters suggested that "Big
Green was a casualty of a broader political climate that really had nothing
to do with the environment. You can't pull a Democrat or Republican
lever on the propositions. But you can pull 'no,' and I think that's what
people did." Another environmentalist anonymously admitted, "As a
matter of both tactics and policy, Big Green was a mistake. It tried to make
too much controversial and complicated law in one ballot measure."34
Voters were presented with a parallel situation on the same 1990
ballot with two bond initiatives affecting timber harvesting, Prop 130,
"Forests Forever," and Prop 138, "Big Stump." Wealthy California conservationist Hal Arbit spent $5 million to sponsor Prop 130, which authorized a $742 million bond issue to acquire ancient forests and preserve
wildlife habitat, retrain loggers, ban clearcutting, and mandate sustained
yield standards. The timber industry countered with an ad campaign
portraying Prop 130 as an extremist measure supported by fringe environmental activists such as Earth First! It also wrote its own measure,
Prop 138, which would authorize a $300 million bond issue to finance
private reforestation projects and urban and rural tree planting programs, negotiate timber management plans, and prohibit the state from
acquiring timberland without the agreement of the owner. Prop 138 was
designed to allow timber corporations to continue to maximize their
operations with a minimum of state interference. Both of these initiatives
failed to pass, Prop 130 with 52% "no" votes cast, and Prop 138 with
71 % "no" votes cast. 35
Many observers conclude from the 1990 ballot that there existed a
crisis in the democratic process due to abuses of direct democracy. As
pollster Mervin Field suggests, "More times than not, when the 'No'
side really takes aim, has the money and can find real or alleged flaws, it
33. Shultz, 83; San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990; <http:/ /holmes.
uchastings.edu>.
34. San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990; Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990.
35. <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu>.
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can completely turn public opinion around."36 Yet, while still affirming
the tremendous power that corporations have in influencing politicians
and the public and even in writing law, we maintain our faith in voters'
instincts. Prop 128, a sprawling approach to law-writing and an example
of the political misuse of the initiative process, failed with 64% "no"
votes. Props 135 and 138, both examples of corporate-sponsored and
deliberately misleading counter-initiatives, failed with a strong 70% and
71 % "no" votes cast. Prop 130, a narrowly defined initiative such as
voters often approve, yet put on the ballot by a wealthy individual who
himself had disturbingly close ties to the timber industry lost, although
only by a slim margin of 52% "no" votes cast. In all these cases, the
voters seem to display a healthy dose of common sense.
To extend our argument, Props 128, 135, 130, and 138, as well as
the rest of the 1990 ballot need to be examined in a larger context. The
following is the full and impressively long list of initiatives presented to
voters on the Fall 1990 ballot:
State Ballot Propositions, Fall 199037
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Local Hospital Districts
Rail Cars and Locomotives
Alcohol Tax
Property Tax Exemption for Earthquake Improvements
Natural Environment, Public Health
Drug Enforcement, Taxation, Bonds
Forest and Wildlife Protection Bond and Initiative
Term Limits, Ethics, Campaign Funding
Marine Resources Initiative
Anti-Drug Programs: Sales Tax and Prison Terms
Alcohol Tax Initiative
Pesticide Regulation
Voting on State and Local Taxes
Initiative and Referendum Process
Forestry Programs and Timber Harvesting Bond and Initiative
Prison Inmate Labor
Terms of Office, Retirement, Operating Costs
Toxic Chemicals
Veterans Bonds
Higher Education Bonds
Prison Bon9s
Housing Bonds
K-12 School Bonds
County Jail Bonds
Water Bonds
Park and Recreation Bonds
County Courthouse Bonds
Child Care Bonds

36. San Franoisco Chronicle, 23 March 1996.
37. San Francisco Chronicle, 31 October 1990.
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The fall 1990 election saw one of the smallest off-year voter turnouts in the state's history. Political commentators suggest that nervousness about economic recession and the potential war in the Persian Gulf
kept voters home, but there may have been additional reasons.38 Out of
the twenty-seven initiatives, thirteen, or 50%, were bond issues. A small
voter turnout generally means that older, more conservative voters dominate at the polls, and these voters, when worried about the economy,
were much less likely to pass bond issues which would increase the
state's debt load. Even Prop 148, an initiative placed on the ballot by the
legislature to establish a fund for a water resources program failed with
a 56% "no" vote, whereas moderate water initiatives were typically
approved by voters. In 1988, for example, all three clean water propositions placed on the ballot by the state legislature passed by healthy
margins of 72%, 62%, and 65% "yes" votes.39
Out of the twenty-seven 1990 initiatives, only four (138, 135, 130,
and 138) have been treated in the literature as related to the environment. We suggest that this definition of what is "environmental" is very
limited, and extend our analysis to three additional initiatives, Prop 148
(discussed above), Prop 141, "Toxic Chemical Discharge," and Prop 132,
"Marine Resources." These initiatives also involve environmental issues
and their omission from analyses both of direct democracy and
environmental initiatives is both startling and distorting.
Prop 141 was presented to voters by the legislature in order t o
extend to public agencies the 1988 Prop 65, which prohibited private businesses from discharging or releasing toxic chemicals into any of the
state's water systems. Independent state Senator Quentin Kopp, Assemblyman Lloyd Connelly, and taxpayer advocate Richard Gann promoted
Prop 141 as imposing uniform standards on both private businesses and
public agencies, thereby plugging a significant loophole left by Prop 65.
Opposition came not from industry, but from various public water
agencies and water management systems which resisted forced compliance with Prop 65's safeguards. Prop 141 provides a good example of
the sort of legislation that might have been passed through negotiations
in the state capital without going to voters. That it was presented to
voters attests to the strength of resistance within public agencies. Swept
along the current of "vote no" and fears of increased costs, Prop 141
failed, but by only a 52% "no" vote.40
Prop 132 was the only environmental initiative to pass in 1990, with
a 56% "yes" vote. The initiative was sponsored by Assemblywoman
Doris Allen, chairwoman of the Committee to Ban Gill Nets, and
38. Los Angeles Daily Journal, 7 November 1990.
39. <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu>
40. Ibid.
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supported by state Senator Quentin Kopp, the highly respected and
non-political Marine Mammal Fund, The Dolphin Connection, a university professor of environmental biology, and an Earth Island Institute
research biologist. Opponents included the fishing industry, two
renown, longtime Bay Area seafood restaurants, and the Fisherman's
Union of America. Prop 132 extended the legislative ban on the use of gill
nets and trammel nets in coastal waters of northern California as well as
in central and southern California waters in order to increase protection
of marine mammals. It compensated fishers who lost their gill and trammel net permits with revenues gained from increased fees on sports fishing
activities. Prop 132 was a narrowly defined law to protect marine mammals: costs to the state were minimal, compensation to commercial fishers
was included, and no powerful corporate interests were involved. Even
in the "vote no" climate of 1990, voters passed this animal protection
act. Whereas environmental initiatives that were the product of political
manipulation or were closely related to corporate interests generated a
widespread "no" vote, with Prop 132 voters indicated their ability to
identify and pass a simpler and seemingly fairer measure.
Not only did California voters often vote discerningly, they consistently indicated support for direct democracy and an understanding of
its flaws. A 1992 study found that 66% of the public held a favorable
view of the initiative process, but that 72% found that it had "gotten
out of control in California elections." Voter complaints included "misleading television advertising, the dominance of moneyed special interests,
and the excessive complexity of ballot measures." Some wanted more
disclosure of financial contributors in initiative advertising; others
suggested contribution limits on donations to campaigns. 41 Yet for all
their criticism of the initiative process, voters understood only too well
that business interests were well able to spend the large sums of money
necessary to influence decisions made by California's legislature or to
contribute to its inaction. As columnist Harold Gilliam points out, "For
years there have been reports on pesticides, herbicides and other toxic
wastes that poison workers and water supplies and the people and animals that drink from them. However, with a few honorable exceptions,
the Legislature has taken no effective action. Could it be that campaign
contributions from big polluters have caused lawmakers to be timid on
this subject?"42 For all its weaknesses and potential for abuse, in a
political climate corrupted by corporate power, the initiative process
remained the only method by which citizens had a chance to improve
the quality of their environment.
41. California-Commission on Campaign Financing, p. 19.
42. San Francisco Chronicle, 7 October 1990..
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In The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills identified corporations, the U.S.
President, and the military as a dangerous trilogy of power dominating
American life in the 1950s. Faced with this power, he argued that "only
through the initiative, the referendum, and the recall can an awakened
and intelligent citizenry guaranty American democracy continuing life."
Writing in 1986, after many states had considerable postwar experience
with direct democracy, Joseph Zimmerman continues where Mills left
off, concluding that "the initiative generally has been a salutary adaptation of the legislative process which has educated citizens with respect
to important public policy decisions... Critics notwithstanding, the
general electorate has been discriminating in examining the pro and con
arguments for an initiated proposition prior to deciding upon how to
vote. Experience with the initiative and the referendum supports the
Aristotelian concept of the "collective wisdom of the voters" and mixed
election results show that voters are not "enthralled with the rhetoric of
ideologues," but pass a balance of liberal and conservative initiatives.43
This does not mean that the initiative system is not in need of
reform. After two years of study, in 1992 the California Commission on
Campaign Financing published its findings. Its recommendations
included:
- a 5,000 word limit on initiatives, which would necessarily narrow
their focus;
- a series of public hearings to allow proponents to amend initiatives before a final vote, with a requirement for negotiation between
proponents and the legislature in order to refine wording unchangeable
once passed by voters;
- a mandatory floor vote in the legislature for measures qualified
for ballot to guide voters and clarify political positions;
- amendments to initiatives by the legislature if a super-majority
vote of 60% was attained; a longer time to gather signatures in order to
reduce the financial significance of initially placing an initiative on the
ballot;
- disclosure and limitation of campaign contributors;
- a FCC "fairness doctrine" in publicity for ballot measures;
- revisions to voter pamphlets to increase readability;
- and finally, a return to system struck down by . California's
Supreme Court allowing only conflicting provisions of competing initiatives receiving fewer votes at the same election to fail, not entire
competing initiatives receiving fewer votes.
43. C. Wright Mills quoted in Laura Tallian, Direct Democracy: An Historical Analysis
of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Process (Los Angeles: The People's Lobby, Inc.,
1977), p. 77; Zimmerman, p. 96.
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This latter recommendation was made in order to reflect the will of
voters to pass as many reforms as possible, and to avoid the use of
more "counter initiatives prepared and promoted for the sole purpose
of invalidating an entire initiative" and "more ballot confusion and work
for the courts." The Commission concluded that a modernized and
reformed initiative process was a necessary "check on the potential
abuses of governmental power while the need for that safeguard
remains."44 Given the record of legislative and gubernatorial footdragging and tremendous corporate pressures, this is certainly true in .
the case of environmental legislation. Hardly dazzlingly white, but by no
means absolutely black, the history of direct democracy in California, as
measured by the election results of environmental propositions in the
late twentieth century, does indeed reveal a case for cautious optimism.
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